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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to identify signs of economic dependency China
creates in South America. The study builds on dependency theory by challenging China's
self-categorization as a periphery nation. Using the mixed-methods case study approach,
this study explores the effects of China's going out policy in South America. Specifically,
the focus in the study is on asymmetric trade, increased debt, and economic dependency
in the context of Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador. One of the study's significant findings is
that dependency begins with access. China is efficient at securing access to natural
resources through its trade arrangements, which seem to have a de-industrializing effect.
Another major finding is that although China is not the main variable in South America's
economic status, China holds an essential role in the region's quest for economic and
social development.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Background of the Study
United Nations economic outlook reports in 2013 maintained a positive consensus
for South America. They noted stable inflation rates, modest but steady GDP growth, and
historic lows for unemployment (World Economic Situations and Prospects, 2013).
Seven years later, these same reports paint a divergent picture. The region regressed
economically following a rapid recovery from the 2008 financial crisis (Figure 1). High
levels of debt also re-emerged in the region (Figure 2). Downward growth, stagnant GDP,
increasing poverty rates, rising government debt-to-GDP ratios, and uneven growth are
all terms used to describe current conditions in the region (World Economic Situation and
Prospects, 2019).
Sino-Latin American trade has grown significantly and must be accounted for in
any study of South American economics. Over the past decade, Chinese policy banks
have provided more finance to Latin America than the World Bank and International
American Development Bank combined for a total of over $131 billion in loans since
2009 (China-Latin America Finance Database, 2020; Gallagher & Irwin, 2015, p. 101;
Liang, 2019, p. 437). China is now the top trading partner for several South American
states to include Chile, Brazil, and Peru (Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC),
2019). Chinese economic and political activities in the region center on distinct extractive
industries and massive infrastructure projects. The region is potentially developing a
reliance on China as a source of finance and as a destination for exports.
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While many studies have identified the growing geopolitical influence of China in
South America, few have quantified economic data on individual states and specific
economic sectors. Research focuses on China’s growth, but then devolves along political
divides, focusing not on data, but the problem set of a communist nation exporting
manufactured goods in return for massive amounts of natural resources. This thesis seeks
to fill that research gap and contribute to the academic conversation on Chinese activities
in South America.
Three South American States provide a multi-layered perspective of Sino-South
American relations: Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador (ACE). The research portion of the
thesis is conducted in the context of ACE and China. ACE provide qualitative and
quantitative data on China’s multifaceted approach to regional engagement.
Statement of the Problem
China is suspected of creating trade dependency, increasing debt, and encouraging
de-industrialization in South America (Giraudo, 2019, p. 74; Gonzalez-Vicente & Annita,
2020, p. 233). China is a primary export destination for South America creating the
potential for trade dependency (Barton & Rehner, 2018, p. 82; Laufer, 2013, p. 127).
States remain focused on primary goods by exporting raw material for processing
elsewhere and losing the opportunity to add value to their resources. This can lead to deindustrialization as the production of commercial or consumer goods is overshadowed by
the opportunity to export massive amounts of raw material. The study intends to examine
these trends within the context of ACE and China’s increasingly significant role in the
region.
2

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to identify signs of economic dependency China
creates in South America. The study measures economic indicators of South American
states which have had a consistent economic and political relationship with China in the
last ten years. Qualitative and quantitative data on trade, financial flows, and
infrastructure projects in ACE are used to investigate trade dependency and asymmetry,
debt, and de-industrialization in South America. Exploring the nuances in the economic
ties between China and ACE can inform the overall economic performance in South
America.
The region is aware that development is needed. During a recent UN Economic
Commission for Latin America and The Caribbean (ECLAC) forum the Executive
Secretary of ECLAC, Alicia Bárcena, stated, “We have to go to a different future. Latin
America and the Caribbean cannot continue to tolerate the structural injustice that
distinguishes it” (ECLAC, 2021). Chinese interactions are very structured and will have
significant impacts on the economies of the developing states that comprise South
America. The thesis seeks to inform on this phenomenon in the context of Sino-ACE
relations and illuminate if China offers a different future.
Significance of the Study
China is at a historical juncture; in 2013, China began its Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). China advertises the BRI as an opportunity for developing an economic and
political community apart from the traditional western models (Barton & Rehner, 2018,
p. 81). In the context of South America, the BRI is best described as a long-term plan to
3

create social and political connections while securing access to the region’s natural
resources (Hiratuka, 2018, pp. 8-9). The BRI is arguably the political manifestation of
China’s massive need for natural resources. China’s growth outpaces its domestic
resources and has forced the nation to acquire them elsewhere (Oviedo, 2013, p. 14).
Chinese economic statecraft in the Western Hemisphere is still developing; now is
the time for early analysis. Economic statecraft is the influence of a state’s economic
activities by an outside party to achieve a political end (Liang, 2019 p. 434). China uses
its economic power on both developed and underdeveloped nations when Beijing feels its
national interests are at stake (Kwon, 2020, p. 104). This study illuminates economic
statecraft and its effects on sustainable development. Specifically, it informs on
relationships and outcomes between the primary product-based economies of South
America versus China’s consumer-based economy. China insists it is helping nations
develop and providing an alternate to western sources of capital and western destinations
for exports that kept developing regions marginalized. State and industry-focused
analysis builds on a growing literature that seeks to explain persistent problems in
developing regions and measure the validity of China’s claims as partner in development.
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Figure 1
Rate of Growth as a Percentage of Annual GDP in Latin America and ACE
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Figures by author, data collected from Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean, CEPALSTAT: Databases and Statistical Publications)
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Asymmetric trade, increased debt, and de-industrialization are all concerning
characteristics of Sino-South American relations. This chapter explores trade, debt, and
prospects of industrialization through the lens of dependency theory. The first section
details the historical context of the theory. Second, the review notes the gaps which exist
in the literature on Sino-South American relations under the emergence of two dominant
schools of thought. The chapter then proceeds into current trends and themes before
concluding with areas for continued research.
Historical Context of Dependency Theory
Dependency theory has been used to explain the historic and persistent
inequalities which exist between the Global North and Global South. The colonial history
and economic dichotomy between “core” and “periphery” states is the foundation of the
theory (Farny, 2016). The Global North or core states represent economically developed
states with strong manufacturing sectors and diverse export profiles. Periphery states are
underdeveloped with export-driven, commodity-based economies, reliant on specific
industries or products. The theory focuses on “center-periphery dynamics” (Milani,
2021). These dynamics include asymmetric trade relationships, reliance on the core for
capital flows, and narrow domestic production capabilities in the periphery (Farny, 2016).
The development of dependency theory is uniquely intertwined with South
America. Raúl Prebisch, one of the theory’s most important scholars, served as the chief
trade diplomat for Argentina during the 1930’s. While in position, Prebisch witnessed a
British market crash adversely affect Argentina’s export sector. Prebisch realized
6

Argentina’s narrow economic focus on exporting primary products left the country
dependent on the markets of wealthy nations. Prebisch would move on to serve on the
ECLAC and continue to build upon dependency theory. He would progress the theory
away from Neo-Marxist tendencies, which promoted centralized socialist economies,
towards a more neo-liberal perspective. The neo-liberal ideology Prebisch advocated for
suggested protectionist policies should be used to prevent mass imports of manufactured
goods. This in theory would allow domestic markets to develop (Schmidt, 2018).
Gaps in Literature
Dependency theory is a useful theoretical framework for discussions on South
America’s economic relationship with developed nations. There is not a consensus on
whether China can be categorized as core or periphery or if the relationship with
developing regions can be labeled as dependent. Dependency theory is normally a critic
of western capitalism and the Global North (Giraudo, 2019, p. 63). China’s status as a
communist nation challenges the traditional narrative of the theory. There are two
competing theoretical perspectives: south-south cooperation and western perspective.
Both diverge on how China should be viewed through the lens of dependency.
The south-south cooperation perspective argues China should be categorized as
part of the Global South or periphery. China’s rise has the potential to pull other southern
nations upward in tandem. Liang (2019) compared the effects of Chinese Overseas
Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) in Brazil and Mexico to show that a win-win
relationship is attainable if the right domestic conditions are met. China played a role in
cushioning the 2008 financial crisis in Latin America by increasing the demand for raw
7

materials and maintaining the value of goods. (Hiratuka, 2018, p. 6; Myers & Gallagher,
2020). Chinese investments have a larger impact on infrastructure development and
regional connectivity than resource extraction (Hiratuka, 2018, pp. 8, 20).
China consistently self-categorizes itself as a member of the Global South.
Remarks by the President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Xi Jinping, in 2021 at
an anniversary meeting for the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund and the
Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development reiterated the south-south theme.
During the meeting, the United Nations Secretary General, António Guterres,
commended China’s efforts and noted China’s ability to help developing countries attain
self-sufficient and sustainable development (Jin, 2021).
An increased tendency in the academic literature is to give specific attention to
Chinese policy bank loans in the extractive industries, megaprojects, and uneven trade.
Ellis (2018) studied Chinese-Ecuadorian relations and concluded that China used
Ecuador’s poor credit ratings and weak domestic politics to seize upon high-interest, oilbacked, loan agreements (p. 84). Western scholars repeatedly identified asymmetric trade
relationships (Ellis, 2018; Laufer, 2013; Oviedo, 2013). Argentina’s soy exports highlight
the issues surrounding asymmetric trade. China is the main consumer of Argentina’s soy
yet only allows imports of raw soybean while exporting commodities and manufactured
goods. This creates an imbalance not just in value, but in industrial development as well.
The research suggested this was part of a larger trend that mirrored the region’s history
with colonial powers (Laufer, 2013, p. 127). Puyana and Constantino (2015) in their
study of Chinese land acquisitions in South America, concluded China’s objective is the
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production and export of raw materials and food. In Brazil, the study noted the use of a
Chinese “enclave” that used Chinese labor and therefore had no positive impact on the
local economy (p. 112-113).
China’s ability to serve as a lender of last resort, makes a compelling case for
placing China into the core nation category. Beijing has created a massive trade deficit in
South America and incentivizes states to focus on primary product exports while
allowing China to send manufactured goods into their markets (Giraudo, 2019, p. 64).
Western schools of thought insist these factors create dependency and dismantle China’s
narrative of southern cooperation.
Although the tenets of dependency theory help explain the current economic
struggles of the region, the theory’s application to China-South America relations is
incomplete. Some tend to view China as predatory; scholars who focus on south-south
cooperation acknowledge troubling trends but place the onus of success on South
American policies (Ellis, 2018; Liang, 2019, p. 447). Analysis of trade asymmetry and
financial flow helps bridge gaps in literature and come to a more nuanced understanding
on dependency in South America.
Trends and Themes
Dependency theory has been used to frame the problem of Chinese resource
extraction in developing regions (Abdenur, 2017, p. 4; Barton & Rehner, 2018, p. 82).
Given the recent nature of the issues, a limited body of literature explores this
phenomenon. There are several trends and themes which inform Sino-South American
relations and dependency theory in South America.
9

Gonzalez-Vicente and Montoute (2021) used dependency theory to assess current
Chinese-Caribbean relations. They noted: “The continued dependence on the plantation
sector and other similarly foreign-controlled, natural resource-based and export-oriented
sectors provided a good explanation of the external underpinnings of postcolonial
underdevelopment” (p. 222). Gonzalez-Vicente and Montoute concluded economic
relationships with China often reinforce a propensity for developing nations to selfcategorize themselves into periphery countries by setting themselves on a narrow
development trajectory.
Giraudo (2019) in her study of the Chinese soybean trade in South America built
on the concept that nations are obstructed from determining their development paths. She
found China’s economic influence manipulates entire portions of a state’s market. In the
case of soy, China influences the production matrix to encourage only production and
exportation of unprocessed beans. This diverts states away from industrializing around
their primary products, in this case, the production of soy oil and meal (Giraudo, 2019,
pp. 61, 64). More than simple trade imbalance, dependency theory predicts an industrial
regression. The trade structure between Latin America and developed nations causes a
net loss of capital for Latin America. The added value of manufactured goods Latin
America imports outpaces the value of the primary products the region exported.
Financial dependency is a major theme in current literature. The Chinese
Development Bank (CDB) and China Export-Import Bank (China Ex-Im) play a
significant role in enabling Chinese firms to gain access to South American markets. The
CDB and China Ex-Im have historically been used as policy banks, meaning their main
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purpose is financially supporting the PRC political and economic goals (Gallagher &
Irwin, 2015, pp. 101-102). Naturally, these banks also provide loans to South American
states. The loans provided to South America often function to ensure the proper
equipment and infrastructure is available for resource extraction and exportation (Laufer,
2013, pp. 137-138).
Large loans often follow debt crises and debt restructuring in South America.
Argentina defaulted on over $100 billion in 2001 (Luque, 2018, p. 606). In 2008,
Ecuador defaulted on over $3 billion, citing predatory debt holders (Eugina, 2008).
Venezuela’s state-controlled oil company defaulted on all bonds in 2019, effectively
baring itself from the global market (Cohen & Oatis, 2020). These three states are among
the top destinations for Chinese loans (The Inter-American Dialogue, 2020). Debt
defaults isolate countries from external capital markets causing them to look towards
China. This pattern earned China a reputation as the lender of last resort, which helps
explain the high-interest rates associated with their loans (Stanley, 2018, p. 79).
There is also a social context behind South American states and their appetite for
Chinese lending. International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans in Latin America have created
social unrest in the past. Protests usually focused on austerity measures linked to IMF
loans. In Argentina and Bolivia, protests against IMF loans resulted in the resignation of
the countries’ presidents (Ortiz & Béjar, 2013, p. 496). IMF loans have historically led to
upheaval in the region because the population views these loans as an afront to national
sovereignty (David & Béjar, 2013, pp. 493, 496). These factors make many states in the
region dependent on Chinese financing.
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China is a core country in bilateral trade. Chinese investments in resource
extraction ensure a reliable supply of South American raw material in exchange for
manufactured goods. The commodification of resources, however, slows industrial
growth (Oviedo, 2013, pp. 14-15). China’s high purchasing capacity combined with a
growing demand for raw materials placed many South American states on a narrow
economic development path. This is exacerbated by Chinese imports of basic goods to
the region which can stifle domestic production (Barton & Rehner, 2018, p. 82). The
nations positioned to provide long-term natural resource access have undergone a sharp
increase in manufactured imports from China. These same states’ exports did not increase
accordingly and led to a growing import coefficient. Apart from monetary differences in
trade flow, China restricts imports to specific commodities while exporting a wide array
of manufactured products to the region (Hiratuka, 2018, p. 11).
While trade profiles between China and South America follow a core-periphery
model, not all states experience a trade deficit with China. Brazil, which has the highest
level of OFDI from China, enjoys a trade surplus (Hiratuka, 2018, p. 14; Liang, 2019, p.
441). Chile, which was the first in the region to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with
China, has historically enjoyed a trade surplus as well (Gachúz, 2012, p. 143). South
American states do use legislation and diplomacy to curb Chinese imports. Latin America
has more anti-dumping laws than any other region, and the main target of the regions’
laws is China (Facchini, Olarreaga, Silva, & Willmann, 2010, pp. 447-448). Despite
protectionist policies and promising results in Brazil and Chile, the region suffered a $67
billion trade deficit with China in 2019 (Liang, 2019, p. 446).
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Trends point to a dependent relationship where China enjoys core-nation status
and South America acts as a periphery region. This claim seems to hold under an analysis
of both debt and trade. The existence of states who do not have a trade deficit with China,
however, suggests that domestic policies do play an important role.
Continuing Research
It is difficult to conclude Chinese OFDI and trade create a wholistically dependent
relationship in South America. Loans and trade arrangements come with unfavorable
characteristics to include high-interest rates, trade deficits, and trade dependency. Yet the
correct way forward for Sino-South American relations is in the early stages of
development. More research is needed especially on the megaprojects China is
undertaking in the region (Abdenur, 2017, p. 16). It is too early to determine if China’s
engagement is sustainable and beneficial (Shapiro, Vecino, & Li, 2017, p. 34).
South-south cooperation scholars argue the region needs a better understanding of
China’s strategy. With a better understanding and improved domestic policies, the
economic relationship can produce a beneficial south-south partnership (Barton &
Rehner, 2018, p. 86; Hiratuka, 2018, p. 21; Liang, 2019, p. 447). This perspective points
to success in Peru and Chile who de-industrialized and negotiated FTA’s with China,
accepting their roles as periphery states rather than competing with Chinese exports
(Oviedo, 2013, p. 24).
The assertion that China’s involvement is both a challenge and an opportunity
faces significant hurdles. There is little evidence China has produced economic
development in the region (Laufer, 2013, p. 140). There is compelling evidence of China
13

creating economic dependency in South America (Puyana & Costantino, 2015, pp. 115116). The only win-win relationships are for China and South American political elites, at
the expense of the host nation (Ellis, 2018, p. 95).
Both perspectives share common ground and have strengths and weaknesses. The
south-south cooperation perspective accurately predicted positive results in Sino-Chilean
relations and negative results in Venezuela. Yet, this theory struggles to come to a
consensus on how smaller commodity-driven economies can shield themselves from
Chinese imports and develop their manufacturing capabilities. The western perspective
can explain trade asymmetries and the risks of heavy state involvement. It fails, however,
to address the failings of western institutions, provide evidence that South America can
find an alternative development path, or address domestic roadblocks. Therefore, deeper
analysis is needed to determine if Chinese economic engagement is beneficial and
sustainable.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
China’s geopolitics are analyzed in ACE using the case study approach. The three
states were purposefully selected for several reasons. ACE give a diverse assessment of
Chinese OFDI for the region. They represent varied political backgrounds. Chile has the
most neo-liberal market in the region and was the first to sign a free trade agreement with
China (Gachúz, 2012, p. 143). Ecuador remains left-wing yet has distanced itself from
the most leftist regimes in the region (González, 2018). Argentina has historically varied
on the political spectrum, yet following Chile, is one of China’s oldest partners in South
America (Luque, 2018, p. 608).
All three states have economically engaged with China in different ways and their
case studies detail the methods of Chinese economic statecraft. Despite political and
economic differences, China is invested in extractive industries in each: oil in Ecuador,
agriculture in Argentina, and mining in Chile. They also share the similarity of having a
core-peripheral model; their exchange structure with China is mainly raw materials for
manufactured goods (Oviedo, 2013, p. 9).
The method explores a wide range of variables between Chinese economic
statecraft and dependency in South America. This diverse case selection and analysis
approach is exploratory and illuminates the relationship between China and dependency.
The research is discriminant because Chinese statecraft as a variable is more continuous
than the outcomes in South America. The level of variation allows the selected cases to
provide representation of the region (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 300).
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Data Collection
Data for these case studies were taken from each states’ central bank, trade
bureau, or government agency responsible for a given commodity. This mainly includes
Banco Central de Chile (BCC), Banco Central del Ecuador (BCE) and Argentina’s
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC). Data consistency is limited by
differences in each states’ method of recording, including level of detail, categorization,
and time frame covered. For industry-specific quantitative data, the research uses
publications from the respective state-owned enterprises such as Chile’s Copper Partners
Investment Company Limited (Cupic) as well as other news sources. China does not
regularly publish loan data (Gallagher & Irwin, 2015, p. 103). The study relies on the
host nation or press releases for most information regarding policy bank loans and
investments.
Data Analysis
Each case study analyzes extractive industries, trade, industrialization, and debt in
ACE. Key portions of the studies include the terms of loans and trade agreements, how
these affected production and export of raw materials, and the profits or debt facilitated
by the arrangement. Qualitative analysis of the cases highlights important distinctions,
similarities, and patterns throughout the region and in China's economic statecraft. While
commodities and modes of Chinese entry into the market vary for each case, one
common metric is each state’s respective level of industrialization for the commodity
being studied.
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Conclusion
The case studies and their respective data cover many of the key indicators of
dependent relationships. This includes foreign finance, trade profiles, and
industrialization. The cases cover the region’s diverse array of natural resources.
Although obstacles and gaps existed in data collected, the following case studies add to
the growing body of research that seeks to understand the economic conditions in South
America and China’s emerging role as a global economy.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES
This thesis presents three case studies devoted to analyzing China’s economic and
political activities in South America. The case studies are relevant because each state has
historic ties to China. Far from a completely new phenomenon, there is a depth of data
that illuminates economic and political trends in each state. Each state has experienced
some type of political friction with China yet has chosen to retain China as an economic
partner. The case studies begin with contextual data before analyzing state-specific
industries, finances, megaprojects, and trade relationships.
Two contextual data sets for the case studies are displayed in Figure 3 and Table
1. First, trade balance varies across the three states. Chile enjoys a large trade surplus,
while Argentina has a massive trade deficit. All three states have increased as import
destinations for Chinese goods to the point where China is their top importer. This data
provides an important perspective for the case studies. Trade asymmetry is not uniform,
nor should it be a foregone conclusion. China is growing not only as a destination for
ACE exports but as an origin for goods itself.
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Figure 3
China's Trade Balance in ACE in USD Billions
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Table 1
China’s Share as a Percentage of Value for Total Imports to ACE

Year
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Argentina

14%

14%

15%
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17%
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18%

18%

19%

20%

Chile

14%

17%

18%
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24%

23%

24%

N/A

Ecuador

N/A

9%

N/A

13%

13%

15%

16%

15%

15%

17%

18%

(Figure and Table by author; data compiled from Instituto Nacional de Estadística y
Censos, 2010-2020) (INDEC): Comercio Exterior, 2020-2011; Banco Central del
Ecuador, (BCE): 3.1.4 Annual FOB Exports and CIF Imports by Continent, Economic
Area and Country 2010-2019; Banco Central de Chile (BCC): Indicadores de Comercio
Exterior, 2010-2020)
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Argentina
This case study examines the effects of Chinese investment in rail and
Argentina’s soy export profile. The study begins with a historical context behind the
importance of soy to China and previous Sino-Argentine friction around soy exports. The
case study then transitions to the recent development of China investing in Argentina’s
railway rehabilitation projects. The relation of railways, soy, and ultimately trade is
relevant. China has been accused of investing in infrastructure only for resource
extraction, with no south-south or positive local impact (Puyana & Costantino, 2015, pp.
113-114). This case investigates this claim while looking for signs of dependency.
China consumes approximately one-third of the world’s total soy harvested every
year. This consumption far outpaces domestic production. China must import millions of
tons, most of which are crushed into meal to feed livestock (Bronstein & Polansek,
2019). China’s main soy exporting partners are the United States, Brazil, and Argentina,
however, China has recently begun reducing its imports of U.S. soy. In 2010, China
imported nearly 50% of its total soybean from the United States, in 2019 that number had
been cut to 24% (Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC): China, 2020). Argentina
offers a natural trade partner to diversify China’s pool of soy-producing states in South
America.
Sino-Argentine soybean trade relations have existed on a pendulum swinging
from restrictive to cooperative over the last decade. Trade relations were stressed in 2010
due to the “soybean crisis.” China banned soy imports from Argentina following
Argentina’s anti-dumping laws. China claimed Argentina was not complying with
sanitation requirements. At the time, Argentina was able to weather the crisis because it
20

had diversified its export partners (Oviedo, 2013, p. 26). Despite these issues, by 2013,
Argentina exported 73% of its soybeans to China. Soy and its by-products have
historically accounted for one-quarter of all of Argentina’s exports. China recently chose
to invest billions in Argentina’s railway section to connect the grain-producing regions to
the Atlantic coast, a key step in increasing access to the crop. (Amendment No 3
Amended and Restated Contract, 2016, p. 2; China-Latin America Finance Database,
2020).
Financing and Executing the Railway Rehabilitation
Initial negotiations for rehabilitating the railways occurred in Spring 2010 with
dialogues between Argentina’s Secretary of Transportations and China Machinery
Engineering Corporation. The contract for $2.1 billion was ultimately provided by the
CDB and the Industrial and Commercial Bank Limited in 2014 for the Belgrano Cargas
Railway Rehabilitation Project (Amendment No 3 Amended and Restated Contract,
2016). The 15-year loan has an annual interest rate of 7.1% or $ 2.1 billion (Dreher,
Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney, 2017). The San Martín railway was financed through
the China Ex-Im Bank in 2018 for a total of $1.1 billion (Ray, 2019). Argentina’s
external debt as of 2017 totaled $214.9 billion. With interest, the total cost of the
Belgrano railway at the end of the 15-year loan will be approximately $4.2 billionroughly 2% of Argentina’s total debt.
Belgrano connects Argentina’s north and northwest crop regions to the eastern
hubs of Buenos Aires, Rosario, and Santa Fe. San Martín has a horizontal orientation
connecting western crop regions to Buenos Aires (Argentina Ministry of Transportation:
21

Maps, n.d.). Rehabilitation is needed for both systems. Belgrano began to experience
declines beginning in 2010. San Martín had a sharp decline beginning in 2011 which
continued until 2016. The 2015-2016 period were positive years for both these lines and
the trend has held. Argentina’s railways are divided into six lines; Figure 4 compares the
performance of all six. The only recent tonnage increases are in the Belgrano and San
Martin railways; others remained static or showed declines.
Figure 4
Tons Transported Through Argentina’s Six Main Railways
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(Figure by author; data collected from Comisión Nacional del Regulación del Transporte,
2018; Trenes Argentinos Caragas, 2019)
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Railways’ Impact on Soybean Exports
Soy complex accounted for over 24% of Argentina’s exports in 2019 (OEC:
Argentina, 2019). Soy complex includes soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal.
Despite the prominence of agriculture in the state’s economy, Argentine farmers have
historically struggled to meet production costs. Farmers have historically transported
most of their gains to their port destinations by truck. This creates high transportation
costs; the average inland transportation cost from 2008 to 2012 accounted for 10% of the
total cost of soy production (Meade, et al., 2016, pp. 15, 27).
Free on board (FOB) prices are used to represent the total cost of loading a given
shipment of grain from production to port. Historically, Argentine farmers have sold
soybeans for negative returns, with the FOB exceeding the value of their products
(Meade, et al., 2016, pp. 11, 15, 29). Since 2010, soybean FOB prices were consistently
measured by the Rosario Board of Trade. Soybeans present a stable variable compared to
other primary products because their export taxes remained fairly constant over the time
period used (Boroughs, 2020, p. 4; Buryaile, 2016, p. 4). As Figure 5 demonstrates, in
2010, 2014, and 2016 Argentine farmers sold at below production costs. If 2015 is used
as the transition point in terms of when transportation costs should lower overall FOB,
then there is no current impact from railway projects on overall FOB prices. From 2010
to 2014 the FOB costs averaged 99% of soybean’s value and from 2015 to 2019 it
averaged 99%.
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Figure 5:
Value of Argentina's Soybeans as Compared to FOB Cost measured in USD
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(Figure by author; data collected from Bolsa de Comercio de Rosiario, 2010-2019 and
INDEC: Argentine Foreign Trade Statistics, 2010-2019)
China seeks to increase access to Argentina’s soy and Argentina hopes to increase
soy as a cash crop. China almost exclusively imports soybeans, preferring to crush them
into soybean meal upon arrival (Bronstein & Polansek, 2019). Several metrics show how
both parties have fared in achieving their respective goals. Despite China’s appetite for
the beans, Argentina has not reduced crushing operations to provide more soybeans to
China. The current soy complex profile in Figure 6 suggests that while there is little
diversity in soybean exports, the overall export of soy complex is well diversified (Bolsa
de Comercio de Rosiario, 2010-2019). From 2010 to 2019, China gradually consumed
higher percentages of Argentina’s total soybean output: from 70% in 2010 to a peak of
95% in 2018. There is no evidence China has negotiated for below-average prices of
soybeans. From 2015 to 2017 China paid slightly above the average price of Argentina’s
total soybean exports. In 2017 and 2018, China bought below average by six and two
percent respectively (OEC: Argentina, 2019; Bolsa de Comercio de Rosiario, 2010-2019;
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INDEC: Complejos Eportadores: 2020-2011). Overall production and exports did not
increase during or immediately following the rail rehabilitation (Figure 7) (Bolsa de
Comercio de Rosiario, 2010-2019).
Figure 6:
Argentina's Global Soy Complex Export Profile in Percentage of Total Tonnage
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Figure 7
Argentina’s Soy Production and Exports in Millions of Tons
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(Figures by author, data compiled from Bolsa de Comercio de Rosiario, 2010-2019,
OEC: Argentina, 2019, and INDEC: Complejos Exportadores: 2020-2011)
Conclusion
Currently, railways are benefiting from Chinese investment. Soy exports remain
diversified, and Argentina is not experiencing industrial regression or progression in this
sector. Future data is needed to accurately assess the rail’s impacts and China’s role as a
major export partner. Fortunately, the future appears to hold many developments. In
December of 2020, Argentina signed another rail rehabilitation agreement for $4.7 billion
with several Chinese rail and engineering firms (Cuenca, 2020). Even bigger news than
more railway loans are the negotiations started in late 2019 to allow Argentina to export
soymeal to China (Bronstein & Polansek, 2019). If this agreement materializes, it could
signal a new chapter in Argentina’s soy export profile; one that could benefit domestic

26

production or create a single export destination similar to the current state of soybean
exports.
Chile
This case study analyses the China-Chilean partnership manifested in several free
trade agreements (FTA). The case study specifically focuses on the exposure of the
Chilean copper market under the FTAs. First, the study discusses the significance of
Chile’s massive copper reserves. Then it details previous attempts by China to secure
access to the semi-precious metal. The study addresses the potential de-industrializing
effects of dependent relationships.
Chile is the world’s top copper producer, mining over twice the amount of its
nearest competitor, Peru. The importance of copper to the Chilean economy is difficult to
overstate; in 2019, copper products accounted for over 45% of the total value of Chilean
exports (BCC: Foreign Trade Indicators Third Quarter 2020, p. 50). China is currently the
leader of copper imports, consuming nearly half of the global total in 2018 (OEC: Copper
Ore, 2018). In 2006, China overtook Japan as the top destination for Chilean copper
exports and has retained that distinction since (BCC: Foreign Trade Indicators Third
Quarter, 2007, pp. 204, 219). Chile’s strategic advantage and China’s skill for securing
resources have created an excellent case study.
The Joint Venture
China has not broken ground in Chile nor pushed OFDI towards resource
extraction. The reason for this is simple, Chile enforces stringent anti-trust laws. An
excellent example occurred throughout 2018 when the Chinese mining firm, Tianqi,
attempted to buy nearly one-quarters worth of the Chilean lithium mining company SQM
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through a Canadian company, Nutrien. The deal was highly contested by the Chilean
anti-trust court and was only approved after provisions were set to protect SQM’s
intellectual property (Laing, 2018). For context, lithium carbonate exports totaled $82
million in 2019, only one percent of the value of copper exports for the same year yet was
still defended with vigor (Banco Central de Chile, 2020, p. 33). Chile has attracted
Chinese investment through various incentives yet has received no significant loans
(Gachúz, 2012, p. 141). This helps to explain why Chile-Chinese trade is omitted in some
loan-measuring datasets.
China had previous success in securing access using the joint venture approach. In
May 2005, Chinese-owned Minmetals and Codelco entered a 50-50 joint venture to form
Copper Partners Investment Company Limited (CuPIC). Through the joint venture,
Minmetals could purchase a set tonnage of copper at the 2006 value until May 2021.
Minmetals, through CuPIC, made an initial payment of $550 million to Codelco to secure
copper and retain an option to purchase a minority share in the yet-to-be-built Gabriela
Mistral Mine in northern Chile (Comisión Para el Mercado Financiero, 2019, p. 73)
The agreement stipulated Codelco would deliver 836.25 kilo metric tons (KMT)
worth of copper cathodes1 over a 15-year period, or 55.75 KMTs per year. At the
negotiated value, the cathodes would sell at between $2.2 million and $3.3 million per
KMT (Minería Chilena, 2016). 55.75 KMTs would account for approximately five
percent of Codelco’s global cathode shipments per year. Unfortunately for Chile, the
global value of Chilean copper cathodes rose sharply in 2006 as displayed in Figure 8.

1

Copper cathodes are pure sheet-like copper squares, they account for most copper sold in Chile.
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Figure 8
Average Global Value of Codelco Cathodes Global in USD Billions
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(Table by author; data taken from Comisión Chilena del Cobre: Price of Refined Copper,
2000-2017)
The partnership was fraught with controversy and ended in 2016. The agreement
was labeled an Onerous Contract and cost Codelco tens of millions (Minería Chilena,
2016). A Chinese minority share in the Gabriela mine was never realized; the mine is
currently owned solely by Codelco (Mining Data Solutions, n.d.). The partnership shows
how China used a joint venture to secure access to resources at low cost and low risk. It
provides a contextual lens in analyzing the FTAs China and Chile share and the potential
impacts on Chile’s export profile.
Chile-China FTAs and the Impact on Copper
In November 2005, China and Chile signed their first FTA which also represented
the first FTA between a Latin American country and China. Following high-profile
negotiations in 2017, the two countries entered the Upgraded Chile – China FTA on
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March 1, 2019 (Saarinen, 2019). In the first 2005 trade agreement, under Article 113:
Mining and Industrial Corporations, both countries agreed to the “promotion of
public/private sector partnerships and joint ventures in the support of the development of
innovative products and services specially related to productivity in the sector activities”
(p. 58). In the realm of developing services and products, China is progressing as a
mining business partner through equipment sales. In fall 2019, Codelco’s largest mine, El
Teniente Division, began using Chinese load-haul-dig shovels in their operations
(Codelco, 2019). Codelco’s smallest mine, Salvador Division, began using the same
equipment in Spring 2020. Public statements made by Codelco employees speak highly
of the economic value of the Chinese equipment which undersells competitors by 20%
(Moor, 2020).
More impactful text continues in “Annex 1, China’s Import Customs Duties on
Imports Originating in Chile.” This annex stipulates immediate removal of tariffs only for
copper ores and cathodes. Further refined products, to include copper wire, were delayed
for a period of ten years prior to having tariff-free status (Foreign Trade Information
Systems, 2005). In the updated FTA there are no further tariff concessions that relate to
the copper industry.
Chile’s copper export profile shows a trend away from intermediate and capital
goods. This is true both in terms of exports to China and in the sum of Chile’s global
copper exports. Figures 9 and 10 show the change in percentage of refined, blistered, and
bulk copper out of total copper exports to China and total global copper exports.
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Figure 9
Chilean Copper Export Profile to China as Percentages of Total Tonnage
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Figure 10
Global Trend of Chilean Copper Export Profile as Percentage of Total Tonnage
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(Tables by author, data taken from Comisión Chilena del Cobre: Anuario de Estadísticas
del Cobre y Otros Minerales 2000-2019)
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Export diversity is another concern. While Chilean copper mines show growth,
China’s share of total Chilean copper has gradually increased as shown in Figure 11. In
2000, China consumed 12% of all Chilean copper exports. By 2019, that percentage had
grown to 49. In official reports, Codelco reaffirms the industry is comfortable with the
current level of diversification (Comisión Para el Mercado Financiero, 2019, p. 1).
Figure 11
Chilean Copper Global Exports Compared to Copper Exports to China in KMT
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0

Global Copper Exports in KMT

Copper Exports to China in kMT

(Table by author, data taken from Comisión Chilena del Cobre, 2020)
Figures 12 and 13 show two important trends. First, China as a buyer provides
financial consistency when compared to the fluctuation of global export values. Second,
China currently pays close to the average market value for their copper. The tables make
a case for an effective use of Chile’s comparative advantage as they avoid selling to
China at markedly low prices and maintain a stable capital flow with a major trading
partner (Comisión Chilena del Cobre, 2020).
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Figure 12
Comparative Value of Copper Exported to China and Average Global Value in Millions USD
per KMT
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Figure 13
Global Copper Profits Compared to Profits from Exports to China in Billions USD
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(Figures by author, data taken from Comisión Chilena del Cobre, 2020)
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Conclusion
Sino-Chile trade relationship shows troubling trends that could lead to a
dependent relationship. These are China’s rapid ascent to main export destination for
Chile’s copper and shifting of Chile’s copper away from refined products. Ultimately,
State-controlled and private mining companies are responsible for negotiating and
executing their copper export profiles.2 Nonetheless, the 2005 FTA reiterated China’s
prejudice towards raw materials. Current trends show the Chilean copper industry
regressing towards a primary product focus while Chile’s export profile is experiencing
de-diversification.
Ecuador
This case study examines financial flows from China to Ecuador. The finances are
analyzed in terms of debt creation, use towards infrastructure projects, and effects on
Ecuador’s energy sector. The case study first details a political shift in Ecuador which
resulted in China becoming their main source of finance. It then measures the volume of
China’s loans and their effects on Ecuador’s debt. The case study transitions to a
discussion on the Ecuadorian oil industry and infrastructure projects, both sectors heavily
influenced by China.
Beginning in 2007 with the election of Rafael Correa, Ecuador set itself on a
political-economic pathway which made it the ideal state to receive massive amounts of
Chinese OFDI. First, in 2008, Ecuador defaulted on over $3 billion in foreign debt,

The country’s copper mining sector can be roughly divided between the state-owned Codelco mining
company, which accounts for most copper produced, and several private mining companies.
2
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tarnishing its international financial standing and isolating itself from traditional lending
sources (Snell, 2015, p. 27). Second, Correa re-oriented Ecuador’s foreign and domestic
policies. Verbalized clearly in the “National Plan for Good Living 2009 – 2013,”
Correa’s policy stipulates, “The state rejects international relations of
submission…Foreign policy also shifts its focus and gives due importance to SouthSouth relations” (The Republic of Ecuador National Planning Council, 2009, p. 79).
Politically, economically, and even geographically, Ecuador offered an ideal location for
China to exercise the BRI initiative in South America.
Chinese Loans to Ecuador
From 2010 to 2018 China issued at least 26 loans to Ecuador for a cumulative
value of over $24 billion. China Ex-Im and CDB issued most loans with an average
interest rate of 5.3% and an average duration of 12 years. (Garzón & Castro, 2018, pp.
28-29; Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2018). These loans mainly funded
infrastructure projects through public debt loans directly issued to Ecuador’s central
government. Non-traditional loans, such as advanced sales of oil, were also used. These
are typically difficult to measure because they are not recorded as foreign debt but rather
private transactions between China and Ecuador’s national oil company, Petroecuador
(Garzón & Castro, 2018, p. 26).
The following tables and figures capture the value of Chinese loans, their cooccurrence to a decline in global oil prices, and their effect on the debt to GDP
percentage. 2014 – 2016 saw a sharp increase in Ecuador’s debt to China (Figure 14)3.

3

Outstanding debt over time was calculated by taking loan amount with interest minus the yearly payment
times the number of years since the start date.
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This occurred at the same time as falling oil prices which was a global phenomenon at the
time (Figure 15).
Figure 14
Outstanding Balance of Ecuador's Debt to China in Billions USD
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Figure 15
Price Per Barrel for Ecuador and OPEC 2010 – 2020 in USD
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(Figures by author, data taken from Garzón & Castro, 2018, pp. 28-29; The InterAmerican Dialogue, 2020; OPEC, 2021 and BCE: Crude Oil Exports, 2011-2019)
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2020

China is by far Ecuador’s largest lender, owning on average over 40% of the total debt
during the period measured (Table 2). Ecuador also cumulated debt from other sources.
Table 2
Ecuador’s External Public Debt in Billions USD
Table 2: Ecuador’s External Public Debt in Billions USD
Year
‘11
‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17 ‘18 ‘19 ‘20
Debt from China
4.6 5.7 5.43 5.5 10.7 13.8 12.3 14.5 12.5 10.5
External Public Debt
8.6
10 10.8 12.8 17.5 20.1 25.5 31.6 37.5 41.3
% Owned by China
45% 53% 42% 31% 53% 54% 39% 41% 30% 23%
(Table by author, data taken from BCE: Movement of External Public Debt, 2011-2019)
Oil for Loans: Separating Fact from Fiction
One of the most controversial and widely mentioned factors of Chinese loans to
Ecuador is the link to repayment via oil. Some claim as much as 90% of all Ecuadorian
oil exports are destined for China because of lending agreements (Ellis, 2018, p. 87).
There are two loans publicly released by Ecuador’s ministry of finance that recorded such
a transaction. The first was signed in August 2010 for $1 billion towards various
infrastructure projects. The loan included a “Sales and Purchase Contract” which
stipulated PetroEcuador would supply thirty-six thousand barrels of crude oil a day and
one-hundred and ninety thousand in bulk per month for purchase by PetroChina for a
duration of four years (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2010). The second loan,
dated June 2011, includes a $5.4 billion loan over eight years. The oil transaction tied to
this loan stipulates 123.48 million barrels of crude oil must be delivered for purchase
over a six-year period, from June 2011 to December 2016, and 6.84 million barrels of
refined fuel oil for the entire year of 2016 (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2011).
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During the years when loans overlapped, 2011-2014, China consumed between
30-35% of Ecuador’s crude oil exports. In 2016, 6.84 million barrels of refined fuel
would have accounted for roughly 60% of all refined fuel exports. From 2007 to 2020
there was no significant change to Ecuador’s oil export profile. It remained
approximately three-fourths crude, one-fourth refined (Banco Central del Ecuador, 20092019). China is an important destination for Ecuadorian oil and has used oil-backed
loans. There is no evidence, however, that China is using loans to consume most oil
exports on a recurring basis or that China is shifting Ecuador away from refined oil
production. In 2019, China accounted for only 3.4% of all crude oil exports (OEC:
Ecuador, 2020).
Infrastructure Investment: Targets, Goals, and Outcomes
Most of the loans are generically earmarked for investment plans or economic
infrastructure. One of the best-known exceptions to this trend is the City of Knowledge
project funded by the China Ex-Im Bank in 2016 for $200 million. Improper
construction, especially electrical, plumbing, and structural flaws hamstrung the project
almost immediately. The Correa administration seized over ten thousand acres of
productive land which it retained even after the project’s failure (Quiroz, 2017). Current
imagery shows dozens of empty lots and fields and numerous incomplete concrete
structures.
Two hydroelectric dam infrastructure projects are especially informative for this
case study: Coca Codo Sinclair (CCS) and Sopladora. Both projects received large
amounts of funding at high interest rates, $1.7 billion at 6.9% interest and $570 million at
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6.35% interest, respectively. Both were 15-year loans from the China Ex-Im Bank. One
of Correa’s goals for the hydroelectric projects was to reduce oil imports (The Republic
of Ecuador National Planning Council, 2009, p. 64).
Data from the International Energy Association shows positive results. Ecuador
grew by over fifteen thousand gigawatts from energy generated by hydropower 2010 to
2019 and increased its volume of hydro produced energy by almost a thousand kilotons
of oil equivalent (International Energy Agency, n.d.). This is significant considering that
in 2018 Ecuador consumed approximately twenty-five thousand gigawatts of electricity.
In terms of oil imports, there is no evidence hydropower has drastically reduced
Ecuador’s intake nor freed surpluses of domestic oil for export. From 2013 to 2020 oil
imports remained virtually static with an average change of under one percent; oil exports
during the same period decreased an average of two percent. (BCE: Oil and Non-Oil
Products-Exports and Imports (FOB) by Economic Area, 2009-2019).
The gains in hydroelectric power are not without caveat. During the construction
of CCS in 2014, an infrastructure collapse killed 14 workers. There are structural
concerns as well with cracks developing in water distributors as the dam settles (Lozano,
2019). During the spring of 2020, the Coco River, on which the CCS dam resides, began
to show signs of serious erosion which geologists linked to poor sediment management at
CCS. In April 2020, erosion in the river caused the rupture of an oil pipeline (Cardona,
2020). In sum, more time is needed to assess the quality of construction and the longevity
and utility of the dams.
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Conclusion
A dependent relationship between China and Ecuador is beginning to establish
itself. Ecuador is reliant on oil and when the value fell it had to look to China as a lender
of last resort. China was willing to oblige yet used the loans to force production and
exportation of oil. Loans from China have also been used in highly inefficient ways, as
shown in the City of Knowledge project. Ecuador demonstrates why domestic policies
and economic diversification matter. It would be false to assert Ecuador is reliant on
China for oil exports. Nonetheless, their reliance on oil exports left them vulnerable to
Chinese loans at high-interest rates during a drop in oil prices. China-Ecuadorian trade
agreements demonstrate China can and will use OFDI as a means of securing access to
natural resources.

40

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION
Summary of the Study
Using dependency theory, this thesis attempts to identify cases of debt,
dependency, and trade asymmetry China creates in ACE. The cases do not definitively
demonstrate China is creating dependency in ACE. The case studies do point to several
important trends. China employs trade agreements, loans, and infrastructure projects to
secure access to natural resources. In each case study we see China using financial might
or trade agreements to ensure that the resource flow is uninterrupted and expanded.
Access, flows of capital, and prejudice towards raw materials are potentially the first step
in the neo-colonial process. China is prejudiced towards raw material. This potentially
sets states on a narrow development path as they forgo the opportunity to add value to
their products. Although the relationship is not one of immediate or total dependency,
China offers no incentives for industrialization or development.
Discussion of the Findings
Debt
Financial flows in the Argentina and Ecuador case studies mainly targeted large
infrastructure projects. These projects funded by Chinese banks produce positive yet
limited results. These results are specific to the industry they support but failed to create
broader change. Argentina’s Belgrano and San Martín railways are successes. The
success has not, however, paid for itself by reducing the overall cost of production or
increasing exports of soy complex. Similarly, Ecuador has not achieved a surplus of
crude oil following infrastructure investments in hydropower. The OFDI did not
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significantly increase debt in Argentina. Debt dependency is the greatest concern for
Ecuador. Chinese loans have certainly added to the national debt, but it is clear Ecuador
is still willing and able to take loans from other sources. China represents a large
percentage, at times accounting for the majority. Currently, Ecuador seems to be
distancing itself from China as a lender.
Dependency
When viewed through the lens of dependency theory, China’s trade relationship in
ACE would produce undesirable second and third-order effects. These could include an
increased reliance on China as a trade partner, reduction of domestically produced capital
goods for primary products, and increased debt. A heavy concentration of trade with
China did affect commodification and de-industrialization yet did so in a more nuanced
manner than most literature describes. Existing literature views domestic production and
industrialization in black and white terms. ACE’s products exist on a broad scale, from
raw goods to more finished capital or consumer goods. Trade with China in Chile’s case
has regressed its resources on this scale. China’s consumption of almost all of
Argentina’s soybean exports has not resulted in Argentina reducing its soymeal or soy oil
exports, which hold higher per-ton value and provide thousands of jobs to Argentinians
(INDEC: Índice de Producción Industrial Manufacturero, 2019).
Implications for Theory and Policy
ACE and Latin America as a region must weigh the cost-benefit of deliberate
development path selection. Chile seems to be accepting its role as a primary product
economy. Argentina is resisting the temptation to divert energy from processing soy to
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provide raw beans. The decision is a delicate one. Factors such as China’s continued
economic growth and the value of raw material remain uncertain. There are also domestic
implications for reducing the creation of capital goods and allowing Chinese financing to
dictate infrastructure development.
Ecuador highlights a crucial decision point other South American states must
come to terms with: do they reject western sources of finance to avoid austerity measures
in exchange for Chinese lending? Adaptation of financial reforms that removed barriers
to loans and investments are viewed positively. Yet, even before Chinese investments,
large flows of capital and imports were adversely affecting the balance of payments in
periphery countries (Lampa, 2021, pp. 121-122).While Chinese lending at the surface
level respects national sovereignty, the quality of infrastructure projects, mandated use of
Chinese labor, and ties to repayment via natural resources possess financial and political
risks. In sum, policymakers in South America must carefully navigate their role in
China’s international division of labor.
Recommendations for Further Research
Further research is needed in several areas of study. Chinese-funded infrastructure
projects in ACE need more time, both for their completion and for measuring their utility.
This study did not conduct in-depth analysis of the local impact of megaprojects. This is
an important step forward, especially regarding the use of domestic labor versus imported
labor.
Continued measurement of production profiles is key. The region’s resources
exist on a spectrum from raw to refined and the added value of refined products is a
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crucial step in developing an economy. The impacts on domestic employment, to include
per-capita income, when resources shift on this scale is a key factor future research
should address. Subsequent studies should better isolate other variables that affect the
cost of production and potentially impact a state’s decision to adjust its level of
refinement for a given commodity.
Further theoretical analysis using development theory will enhance future
research. Specifically, is the concept of western, capitalism-driven development possible
in periphery states (Antunes de Oliveira, 2019, p. 1146). The study should challenge the
basic tenet of economic development, that job creation and an expanded tax base
underpin any measurable progress. Future research can add to development theory by
analyzing the successes of policies that maximize a state’s comparative advantages and
the consequences for economic development (Currid-Halkett & Stolarick, 2011, pp. 143,
151). The Argentina case study suggests that small developmental gains are possible.
Chile’s positive net trade balance argues that leveraging comparative advantages can
yield positive results, yet the question remains: does partnership with China present an
opportunity for the region to overcome underdevelopment?
Conclusion
Trade with China does not fit neatly into a dependent or non-dependent category.
China certainly influences the value of South American commodities simply by the sheer
volume in which China consumes them. Strength of influence and heavy use of capital
infer China is a core nation whose relationship with ACE fits the core-periphery model.
The Western Hemisphere must accept that China offers market diversity to a region
typically denied this luxury. Economic and political interaction will continue. How the
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region chooses to rise to the occasion will determine the future of the South America’s
development.
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